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Three new plans for reforming Social Security financing recommend investing a portion of
future payroll deductions in the financial markets. The plans aim to shore up Social Security’s
trust fund, improve individual returns, and enhance national saving. This analysis concludes,
however, that the effectiveness of the plans would depend largely on individual saving and
investment decisions, government fiscal policy, and developments in the financial markets. 
In addition, the proposed reforms could expose the program to unprecedented market risk.
Population aging and slowing real wage growth are
threatening the future viability of the U.S. Social
Security program. If these trends continue as antici-
pated, workers will find it increasingly hard to support
the coexisting generation of retirees as required by the
program’s “pay-as-you-go” financing structure. Social
Security has been accumulating a trust fund to pay for
projected future liabilities (benefits and administrative
expenses) since 1983, when legislation raised the pro-
gram’s annual tax revenues substantially above its
annual expenditures. Nonetheless, the Social Security
Administration projects that without changes to taxes
or benefits, annual operating deficits beginning in
2012 are likely to deplete the Social Security Trust
Fund by 2029.
In December 1996, the federal 1994-1996 Advisory
Council on Social Security presented three alternative
plans for reforming the financing of the program.1 All
recommend investing a portion of future Social
Security contributions in marketable securities such as
stocks and corporate bonds, which offer higher—but
riskier—returns than the system’s existing portfolio of
special U.S. Treasury bonds. The reform plans propose
redirecting investment either within the current tax-
and-transfer framework or through mandatory private
saving accounts in which taxpayers determine how a
portion of their contributions will be invested.
This edition of Current Issues examines how the
Council’s investment proposals address Social
Security’s perceived shortcomings and how they might
affect four key aspects of the program: trust fund
finances and individual returns, retirement system
risk, earnings redistribution and risk sharing, and
national saving. The analysis concludes that the effec-
tiveness of the proposed reforms is highly contingent
on the reactions of individuals and on developments
in government policy and in the financial markets. In
addition, while the plans offer potential benefits, they
would also introduce market risk, which could, under
unfavorable circumstances, compromise the program’s
risk-sharing and redistributive properties.
Challenges to Social Security
Congress enacted Social Security (Old-Age, Survivors,
and Disability Insurance) in 1935 as an intergenera-
tional transfer system in which annual payroll taxes
collected from workers fund retiree benefits in the
same year. Such pay-as-you-go financing is sensitive
to demographic and economic forces that change the
relative size of the nation’s payroll and total retiree
benefits. The alternative to pay-as-you-go financing is
prefunding, in which a single generation saves during
its working years for its own retirement and earns a
market rate of return on its investments.
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of prefunding to the system by raising the Social Security
tax rate above the level necessary for pay-as-you-go fund-
ing, thereby creating surplus operating revenues in the
trust fund. Each year, the trust fund lends these surplus
revenues to the federal government for general spending
by purchasing special nonmarketable U.S. Treasury secu-
rities. In 1996, the Social Security program’s $30 billion
surplus, invested in these securities, cut the total unified
federal budget deficit to $107 billion.
Despite the program’s partially prefunded status, the
burden of Social Security financing is projected to
grow in the wake of demographic and economic trends
over the next several decades (Chart1). The Social
Security  Administration’s intermediate actuarial projec-
tions show sharp increases in the ratio of beneficiaries
to workers, a long-term trend that will outlast the peak
of the baby-boom generation’s retirement in 2010-30.
At the same time, increasingly generous benefits for
past and current retirees, combined with slowing real
wage growth, have increased the average retirement
benefit as a percentage of the average wage.
Faced with meeting these challenges, the 1994-1996
Advisory Council on Social Security—the most recent
in a series of quadrennial commissions convened to
review program performance—has recommended three
reform plans.2 Each plan targets three specific prob-
lems of Social Security: deteriorating program
finances, declining individual rates of return, and the
program’s alleged negative impact on national saving. 
Deteriorating Program Finances. The erosion of
program funding is a major factor motivating the
Council’s reform initiatives. The Social Security
Administration’s demographic and economic outlook
implies that the costs of Social Security relative to the
U.S. payroll will rise sharply. One way to quantify the
rising program costs is to consider that the Social
Security tax rate would have to be raised immediately
from 12.4 percent to 14.6 percent, or more than 2 per-
centage points of payroll, to prefund estimated program
liabilities until 2070 at a constant tax level. An alterna-
tive approach is to consider that taxes would gradually
have to be raised to 16 percent by 2025 and to 18 per-
cent by 2070 for ample pay-as-you-go funding.
Social Security’s actuaries project that without
changes to taxes or benefits, annual operating deficits
will emerge in 2012 and deplete the trust fund by 2029.
Although the projected trust fund exhaustion is more
than three decades away, two program financing issues
fuel the argument for more immediate reform. First, the
program currently fails legally mandated tests of
“long-range close actuarial balance,” which require the
present value of expenditures over a seventy-five-year
period not to exceed the present value of revenues by
more than 5 percent. Second, because surplus revenues
in the Social Security Trust Fund have been allocated
each year toward general government expenditures, the
emergence of operating deficits would trigger broader
fiscal repercussions in 2012, when the government
would need to issue new debt, raise taxes, or cut spend-
ing to meet its Social Security obligations.
Declining Individual Rates of Return. A second
motive for reforming the program arises from the fact
that the typical worker is earning ever-lower rates of
return on Social Security payroll deductions. The
promise of high returns on contributions was a key con-
sideration when Congress adopted the pay-as-you-go
framework in 1935. The first generation of retirees saw
that promise kept, earning average inflation-adjusted
annual returns as high as 35 percent in exchange for
few or no contributions (Advisory Council on Social
Security 1996). Likewise, subsequent generations
earned returns of 4 to 11 percent as tax rates and bene-
fits expanded in tandem with payrolls. By contrast,
Social Security’s actuaries project that the average
worker born after 1930 can expect a return of just 1 to
4 percent under the current system.3
Low National Saving. Further spurring the Social
Security reform proposals is the contention by critics
that the system reduces the incentives for individuals
and the government to save. According to Congressional
Budget Office data, national saving as a percentage of
gross domestic product has fallen steadily, from an
average of more than 20 percent during the 1960s to an
average of less than 15 percent during 1990-95. Many
economists worry that such low saving may compro-
mise long-run capital formation and economic growth.4
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Chart 1
Economic and Demographic Trends Affecting 
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Note:  Values for “number of retirees per worker” after 1995 are projected.However, the characterization of Social Security
financing as a leading culprit in the saving decline is
controversial considering the many macroeconomic,
demographic, and behavioral factors at work.
With respect to private saving, some economists
argue that the expectation of generous benefits (which
is itself changing) has reduced workers’ incentives to
save. However, the empirical evidence on this point is
inconclusive. Although Feldstein (1996) finds that the
existing pool of Social Security “wealth”—the excess
present value of benefits over contributions—reduces
private saving by nearly 60 percent, others find a
smaller or nonexistent saving effect.5 The mixed results
may be due to uncertainty in workers’ expectations—
workers may not reduce saving if they are not sure
about the level or existence of the promised benefits.
With respect to government saving, some econo-
mists believe that the Treasury’s access to Social
Security  Trust Fund surpluses encourages the govern-
ment to spend more (or tax less) than it otherwise
would. To the extent that the surpluses relax fiscal
discipline rather than bridge a predetermined funding
gap, the benefits of building the trust fund are lost.6
Attempts to address this issue through the use of
alternative government accounting—specifically, the
creation of an “on-budget” deficit that excludes Social
Security offsets—have failed in practice. For example,
recent balanced budget initiatives continue to incorpo-
rate Social Security offsets.
Advisory Council Proposals
The three reform plans recommended by the Council
are the Personal Security Account (PSA) plan, the
Individual Account (IA) plan, and the Maintain
Benefits (MB) plan (see box). All three plans advocate
investing some portion of future Social Security contri-
butions in marketable securities, along with other pro-
gram reforms. However, the structure and level of the
new investment vary by plan. The PSA and IA plans
would establish mandatory worker-owned retirement
saving accounts through which individuals would invest
their payroll deductions. The PSA plan recommends
redirecting a substantial portion of new and existing
payroll deductions toward such accounts, while the IA
plan proposes a more modest tier of privatization. The
MB plan rejects privatization while authorizing Social
Security’s Board of Trustees to invest a portion of sur-
plus tax revenues in the stock market.7
The investment features of the reform plans would
have important, and in some cases differential, effects
in four areas: trust fund finances and individual returns,
risk in the retirement system, risk sharing and income
redistribution, and national saving.
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What the Advisory Council Proposals Would Do
Personal Security Account (PSA) Plan Individual Account (IA) Plan Maintain Benefits (MB) Plan
Description Gradually replace program with flat Institute program reforms and  Introduce program reforms; could
baseline annuity and mandatory  supplement existing program with  authorize investment of up to 
retirement saving in individual  mandatory retirement saving in  40 percent of future trust fund 
accounts. individual accounts. surpluses in the market.
Rationale Expand worker discretion over, and  Moderately expand worker discretion Take advantage of higher market 
claim to, mandatory retirement  over mandatory retirement saving  returns to surplus tax contributions 
saving. while retaining core benefit structure. while retaining key features of the 
existing program.
Proposed 
effective date January 1, 1998 January 1, 1998 January 1, 2000
Mandatory Require workers to contribute   Require workers to contribute  None.
saving provisions 5.0 percent of earnings to private   1.6 percent of earnings to individual 
individual accounts. accounts held on government ledger.
Investment Allow workers to invest PSA savings   Allow workers to invest IA savings in   Allow Social Security managers to 
provisions through private brokers in approved  a menu of government-selected  invest a portion of trust fund 
classes of assets. commercial mutual funds. surpluses in stocks.
Total increase in 
payroll deduction 1.52 percent  1.6 percent 1.6 percent (effective 2045)
Breakdown of 8.92 percent to trust fund,  12.4 percent to trust fund,  12.4 percent (14.0 percent  
payroll deduction 5.0 percent to PSA 1.6 percent to IA after 2045) to trust fund
Note:  See Advisory Council on Social Security (1996) for a more comprehensive description of each plan, including proposed program reforms.Trust Fund Finances and Individual Returns. The
reformers’ main rationale for expanding Social Security
investment is to include securities—such as stocks—that
have yielded higher rates of return than U.S. Treasury
bonds in the past. The higher expected return of stocks,
or the “equity premium,” has been sizable in recent his-
tory. Data compiled by Ibbotson Associates (1996), an
industry source of information on historical capital
market returns, show that a representative portfolio
of large-company stocks held from 1926 to 1995,
with dividend reinvestment, would have paid an
average inflation-adjusted return of 5.2 percent more
each year than a portfolio of long-term U.S. Treasury
bonds held over the same period (Chart 2). In formulating
the Social Security reform plans, the Council uses stocks
as the benchmark security, even though Social Security
market investment could encompass the wider range of
financial assets available to mutual fund investors.
The assumption of higher investment returns (the
Council calculations presuppose a more conservative
equity premium of 4.7 percent per year) is central to the
formulation of the reform plans. Each plan relies on
higher investment returns to restore “long-range close
actuarial balance” to the trust fund and to boost individ-
ual rates of return on contributions. 
However, the critical assumption—that future Social
Security investors will earn such a large equity pre-
mium—is misleading for two reasons. First, equity
investors expect higher returns in part because they
accept higher market risk (discussed in the next section),
implying a smaller risk-adjusted equity premium.
Second, the infusion of Social Security funds into the
stock market could itself reduce the equity premium
from its past level by creating new demand for stocks.
The Social Security Administration estimates that stock
holdings in Social Security investment accounts could
grow to between $1 trillion and $2 trillion in 1996 dol-
lars over the next fifteen years, a level that would rival
current equity mutual fund holdings.8
Risk in the Retirement System. All three plans
would introduce market risk to the Social Security system
by expanding investment to a host of financial assets. If
we once again use stocks as the benchmark, we see that
market risk stems from two sources. First, equity
returns can be highly volatile over short investment
horizons. The Ibbotson Associates data show that
annual stock returns have been nearly twice as volatile
as returns on long-term U.S. Treasury bonds since
1926. Likewise, simulation testing using the economic
assumptions of Social Security’s Board of Trustees
shows annual stock returns to be potentially four times
as volatile as interest rates (Advisory Council on Social
Security 1996). 
The Ibbotson Associates data also reveal that the
average equity premium has been significantly more
volatile over decade-long holding periods than it has been
over thirty- or seventy-year holding periods (Chart 2). In
fact, the average annual equity premium was negative
over seven out of sixty overlapping ten-year holding
periods since 1926, indicating that equity returns in any
given decade may not only fall far short of their historic
average but may even trail U.S. Treasury bond returns.
The volatility of equity returns declines significantly over
holding periods of thirty or more years, during which the
equity premium has always been positive.
A second source of market risk arises from the fact
that past returns may not represent the full range of pos-
sible future outcomes. Despite the equity premium
observed in overlapping holding periods in the past,
economists are wary of predicting future performance
from data on so few independent holding periods. The
fundamental forces underlying the equity premium are
complex and may deviate from past patterns in the
future. Therefore, it is difficult to predict the level of
equity returns that future investors can reasonably
expect even over long holding periods.
A counterbalance to new market risk is the reforms’
potential reduction of political risk. Political risk exists in
the current financing structure because legislators can
alter the benefits promised under the Social Security pro-
gram at any time. Although such political discretion
would remain in the MB framework, it would be reduced
under the IA and PSA plans insofar as the individual
investment accounts established by these two plans are
immune to government intervention.
Risk Sharing and Income Redistribution. In addi-
tion to altering the program’s risk exposure, the reforms
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Chart 2
Average Annual Equity Premium by Holding Period
Source:  Author’s calculations, based on Ibbotson Associates (1996).
Note:  The last data point of the ten-year series represents the average annual 
return from 1986 to 1995; the last data point of the thirty-year series represents 
the average annual return from 1966 to 1995.
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averagecould change the extent to which Social Security pools
risk and redistributes income, both within a single gen-
eration and across generations. The current framework
pools the risk of old-age poverty within a generation
through redistributive benefit formulas that transfer
funds from high- to low-wage earners. This redistributive
function meets societal equity goals, and may also
enhance the economy by encouraging individuals to
undertake productive but potentially risky enterprises
while working. At the same time, the current pay-as-
you-go system pools the risk of old-age poverty across
generations by transferring income from workers to the
coexisting generation of retirees.
Social Security’s risk-sharing features would be
maintained and extended to any new market risk under
the MB plan but would be diminished to varying
degrees under the IA and PSA plans. By linking retire-
ment benefits more closely to individual earnings and
investment performance, the IA and PSA plans would
limit transfers from high- to low-wage earners within a
single generation. Similarly, by emphasizing saving
accounts held by a single generation over time, the two
plans would reduce the extent to which workers subsi-
dize their retired counterparts.
Individual risk would increase most under the PSA
plan. Although the centralized part of the program
would be highly redistributive, granting all workers the
same annuity of $410 per month regardless of their life-
time tax contributions, the annuity would also represent
a much lower level of guaranteed retirement income
support. Also, while Social Security’s actuaries project
that the annuity plus account proceeds would yield all
workers more retirement income than the current sys-
tem does, the reliance on investment performance would
also generate a wider range of possible Social Security
payouts.9 For example, unexpectedly low investment
returns could leave minimum-wage workers with less
monthly retirement income than the current $571.10
National Saving. The net effect of the reform pro-
posals on national saving is impossible to determine in
advance because individuals and the government may
react to reforms in a range of potentially offsetting
ways. If, as many critics fear, the new investment pro-
posals fail to boost saving, they could merely shuffle
assets and risks between Social Security and other
investors. Then the reforms would not produce the
intended economic benefit, nor would they relieve the
burden of high retirement costs on future workers.
Reformers hope that the PSA and IA plans will
encourage private saving through a combination of struc-
tural and financing changes. The structural change—
introducing private saving accounts—is intended to
make Social Security more closely resemble a saving,
rather than a tax-and-transfer, vehicle. However, the
positive saving impact of such a structural change may
not materialize if the reforms also alter the incentives
facing individuals. For example, an individual may
expect a larger or more secure retirement income as a
result of reforms and thus may offset the mandatory
Social Security saving by reducing other precautionary
saving. The net effect on saving could then be neutral or
even negative.
The financing change—increasing the combined
payroll deduction by 1.52 percent under the PSA plan
and by 1.6 percent under the IA plan—holds greater
promise for augmenting private saving. Individuals
might still reduce other long-term saving or increase bor-
rowing to maintain spending patterns, but it seems
unlikely that these reactions would wholly offset the
higher deduction. Thaler (1990) argues, somewhat con-
troversially, that individuals do not view all types of sav-
ing as fungible, but instead keep separate “mental
accounts.” For example, many individuals may be
unwilling to compensate for higher Social Security
deductions by borrowing against pension or home equity.
With respect to government saving, the reforms’
ability to generate fiscal discipline would be largely a
political phenomenon. Social Security’s actuaries pro-
ject the unified budget deficit to grow substantially
over the next fifteen years under the PSA and MB plans
because of diversion of funds from special government
securities. This diversion could generate fiscal disci-
pline in two ways. First, an aversion to issuing new
public debt to replace lost access to trust fund surpluses
could encourage politicians to impose greater fiscal
restraints, especially in the current balanced budget
climate.11 Second, even if the government issued new
public debt, investors’ increased awareness of govern-
ment borrowing could create pressures for subsequent
reductions in public borrowing.
Conclusion
The Council’s new Social Security investment proposals
are designed to improve program finances, reverse the
trend of declining returns on contributions, and dimin-
ish any deleterious effect on national saving that the
program currently has. The proposals recommend rais-
ing payroll deduction rates, establishing mandatory
individual saving accounts, and investing in the finan-
cial markets to achieve these goals.
The analysis here suggests that policymakers might
wish to review the new investment proposals with two
key considerations in mind. First, the effectiveness of
any proposal implemented will be contingent on individ-
ual saving and investment decisions, government fiscal
policy, and financial market developments. If the
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behavioral responses and asset market trends assumed
by the Council are not realized, the reforms might not
improve—and could even hamper—the program’s pro-
vision of retirement income to the nation. 
Second, the proposals that establish individual
retirement saving accounts could weaken the program’s
capacity to pool the risk of low earnings (and new market
risk) among workers. Although the proposals could
spur national saving, their reduction of risk sharing
could hinder Social Security’s contribution to promot-
ing economic efficiency and meeting society’s income-
distribution goals. 
Notes
1. See Advisory Council on Social Security (1996). Legislators and
other policymakers have also proposed reforms to Social Security,
which are pending in Congress.
2. The Council members, appointed by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, represent employer and employee groups and
include academics and practitioners in the pension-financing field.
3. The calculation assumes present-law benefits and budget-neutral
taxes. Bosworth (1996) discusses trends in individual returns.
4. The relationship between investment and growth depends on var-
ious factors, including the extent of global capital market integra-
tion and the size of the existing capital stock per worker.
5. See Atkinson (1987) for a survey of studies on social insurance
and saving.
6. However, if Social Security surpluses fund capital expenditures,
they contribute to national saving even as they increase spending.
7. The MB plan calls for further study before Social Security’s
Board of Trustees undertakes stock market investment.
8. Some portion of individual account investment would not con-
tribute to U.S. stock market demand because of portfolio reshuf-
fling and foreign equity purchases.
9. Higher replacement rates under the PSA plan stem partly from
the fact that tax increases take effect earlier than they do under
other reform plans or under present law.
10. First-time-eligible minimum-wage workers in December 1995
received a primary insurance amount of $571.50 (Social Security
Administration 1996). Calculations for this article indicate that a
minimum-wage worker earning $8,840 in 1995, working for forty
years, and contributing 5 percent of his or her gross salary to a PSA
plan account would have to earn an average annual inflation-
adjusted rate of return of 2.5 percent to fund a twenty-year retire-
ment at the same level. Based on the Ibbotson Associates data, the
risk to this worker of earning a return below 2.5 percent in the long
run would be higher from an overly conservative investment strategy
(a 100 percent government bond portfolio) than from an overly
risky one (a 100 percent stock portfolio). 
11. In contrast, the IA plan would actually lower the deficit by cut-
ting program costs but leaving trust fund revenues largely intact
(directing only new payroll deductions to individual accounts). 
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